We address questions about Chapter 11 stocks regarding their trading environment, fundamental value, and performance. First, there exists active trading for Chapter 11 stocks throughout the bankruptcy process. Second, equity value after filing is positively related to asset value, asset volatility, risk-free rate, and expected duration and is negatively related to liabilities. Furthermore, the return correlation between bankrupt stocks and their matching samples exhibits non-linearity similar to out-of-money call options. Third, investing in Chapter 11 stocks incurs large losses. Consistent with heterogeneous beliefs and limits to arbitrage, stocks with higher levels of information uncertainty and more binding short-sale constraints experience more negative returns.
Introduction
During the recent financial crisis, many firms fell into distress and filed for bankruptcy. The number of total bankruptcy filings surged 32% in 2008 compared to 2007.
1 Meanwhile, there has been increasing coverage in the major media about investing in bankrupt equity after Chapter 11 filing.
2 However, this is an area that academic research has largely overlooked. Many important questions involving the trading environment, fundamental value, and performance of these stocks remain unanswered. Presumably, the lack of research is due to the lack of data since most bankrupt stocks are delisted from major exchanges before or around bankruptcy filings, rendering subsequent market data unavailable in traditional databases such as CRSP. Using a unique dataset from Pink OTC Markets Inc., this paper sheds light on these topics.
In our sample of 602 Chapter 11 filings from 1998 to early 2006, most stocks are delisted from major exchanges and resume trading on Pink Sheets, an electronic quotation system operated by Pink OTC Markets Inc. In contrast to the traditional view that trading is scarce except for initial short-covering by previous short-sellers, we find that active trading activity exists throughout the Chapter 11 process. Despite the initial decline in prices and widening of bid-ask spreads, more than 50% of these stocks are traded on any given day, even for the firms that have been in Chapter 11 for as long as three years. There is also a significant decrease in the institutional ownership for these stocks accompanying the bankruptcy filings. After the filing, more than 90% of the investors are individual investors.
Although in most cases shareholders eventually receive nothing in the final reorganization or liquidation plans, our sample indicates that these stocks trade well above zero immediately after Chapter 11 filings. The majority of previous studies (e.g., Franks and Torous, 1989; Weiss, 1990 , Eberhart, Moore, and Roenfeldt, 1990 , Franks and Torous, 1994 Betker, 1995a) about bankrupt equity valuation focus on the violation of the absolute priority rule (APR). APR violation occurs when creditors are not fully satisfied before shareholders get any payments. In particular, Eberhart, Moore, and Roenfeldt (1990) show that equity valuation right after filing reflects the market expectation of APR violation. In contrast, we resort to the hypothesis that bankrupt equity is, although out-ofmoney, a call option on firm assets. Chapter 11 allows the firm to continue its ongoing business operation. It is possible that business might improve and the equity might be evaluated in-the-money again.
3 Applying the option theory enables us to expand the scope of bankrupt equity valuation to include factors that have not been examined in the prior literature, such as asset volatility, risk-free rate, and expected duration. For example, ''In the energy sector, some companies filed for bankruptcy after getting squeezed between the credit crunch and plummeting oil prices. But oil prices have rebounded, increasing cash flow as well as the value of potential drilling sitesy The shares have been trading for less than 25 cents since the filing; the analyst thinks they could be worth $1.50 to $5y,'' quoted from ''Betting on the Equity in Bankrupt Companies'' by Aaron Pressman on June 11, 2009, in Business Week. Using the Black-Scholes model to calculate the option values of bankrupt stocks, we are able to explain about 25-35% of the cross-sectional variation of the observed market values of these stocks. More specifically, we find that the bankrupt equity value right after filing is positively related to asset value, asset volatility, risk-free rate, and expected duration, and is negatively related to liabilities. This finding is robust even after controlling for the expectation of APR violations. 4 Turning to the payoff structure of investing in these stocks, we show that buy-and-hold returns of bankrupt stocks from bankruptcy filing to resolution are heavily right-skewed and resemble the payoff structures of out-of-money call options: most of them die out without any payoff, while a few pay off tremendously. To further investigate whether these payoffs are related to the underlying business fundamentals in the way predicted by option theory, we construct a proxy for each firm's business performance using an industry-and-size matching sample over the Chapter 11 duration. We find that the return correlation between bankrupt stocks and their matching samples exhibits strong non-linearity: it is significantly positive when the matching sample performs well and is zero otherwise. This finding suggests that the payoff structure of bankrupt stocks indeed has the same ''hockey stick'' shape as call options.
Examining the distribution of the buy-and-hold returns of Chapter 11 stocks, we find that betting on these stocks on average generates large losses, both before and after risk adjustments.
5 Our sample's median matching-sample-adjusted monthly return is À15%, and market-adjusted monthly return is À14%. The negative abnormal returns do not cluster in a particular year but persist over time. In addition, this finding is not attributable to the negative delisting returns documented in the prior literature since more than half of our sample firms are delisted two days before their bankruptcy filings. Therefore, our finding of negative returns of Chapter 11 stocks from the first trading day after bankruptcy filing to the final resolution is an indication of the poor performance during the Chapter 11 process, which can last from a few months to a few years.
It is surprising that investors lose so much money investing in Chapter 11 stocks, even given the fact that shareholders are residual claim holders in bankruptcy. Thus, the finding that Chapter 11 stocks underperform indicates the existence of market frictions. Our explanation for the negative returns is motivated by the Miller (1977) theory, which argues that, when investors have heterogeneous beliefs about the value of a risky asset in a market with restricted short-selling, prices will reflect the more optimistic valuation. 6 After Chapter 11 filings, these stocks are mostly traded on Pink Sheets, which does not require information disclosure to investors. Meanwhile, as the stock ownership data shows, institutional investors dramatically reduce their stock holdings around bankruptcy filings, and more than 90% of the shareholders post-filing are individual investors. Many analysts stop covering these stocks due to the lack of interest from institutional investors. Individual investors are presumably less efficient in gathering information and interpreting the available information (Barber and Odean, 2000) . Therefore, the information uncertainty and the divergence of opinion regarding the true value of these stocks increase dramatically after filing. In addition, low institutional ownership produces binding short-sale constraints for these stocks. 7 As a result, the high information uncertainty and binding short sale constraints cause bankrupt stocks to be overvalued. 8 Finally, a unique feature of Chapter 11 stocks is that, on the final resolution date, the reorganization/liquidation plan states explicitly the true value of the stock. 9 In other words, it provides a condition for the stock prices to return to their fundamental values eventually. Thus, the buy-and-hold return from filing to resolution becomes negative.
Many studies (e.g., Chen, Hong, and Stein, 2002 , among others) develop price-optimism models following the approach of Miller (1977) . Two important implications of these models are as follows: (1) the larger the disagreement about a stock's value, the lower its expected return; and (2) the more binding the short-sale constraint, the lower the expected return. Using the bid-ask spread, intraday volatility, and turnover as proxies for information uncertainty, and the percentage of institutional ownership and number of institutional investors as proxies for short-sale constraints, we show that stocks with higher levels of information uncertainty and more binding short-sale constraints experience more negative returns during the Chapter 11 process.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief literature review related to our paper. Section 3 describes the data used in this study. Section 4 investigates the trading environment and ownership of bankrupt stocks. Section 5 tests the hypothesis that Chapter 11 stocks have fundamental values based on the call options on firm assets. Section 6 tests the hypothesis that negative returns of Chapter 11 stocks are due to the initial overvaluation by optimistic investors at filing in the context of heterogeneous beliefs with short-sale constraints. We conclude in Section 7.
Related literature
The value of bankrupt equity has been scrutinized primarily under the framework of violations of the absolute priority rule. Franks and Torous (1989) analyze a sample of bankruptcies from 1970 through 1984 and find that 21 of 27 sample cases exhibit APR violation. Weiss (1990) reports that priority of claims is violated in 27 cases in a sample of 7 D' Avolio (2002) shows that the main suppliers of stock loans are institutional investors, and Nagel (2005) finds that stock loan supply tends to be sparse and short selling more expensive when institutional ownership is low. Short-sellers may face various arbitrageur risks, even if they manage to borrow in the first place. Due to the extreme lack of information about these stocks, rumors about bankrupt companies often lead to rapid increases in the stock price without any justifiable reason, and the arbitrageurs will face high short-squeeze risk. The high collateral requirement of short-selling relative to the low price level of these stocks imposes another type of arbitrageur risk for bankrupt stocks. ''The problem here is that an arbitrageur can tie up a lot of capital shorting in-bankruptcy securities... if the stock price is $0.10 and the arbitrageur shorts 1 million shares, he receives only $100 thousand from the sale but he must post collateral worth perhaps $1.2 million,'' as quoted from ''Bankrupt Firms: Who is Buying?'' by Eugene Fama and Kenneth French on February 23, 2010, at the Fama/French Forum. Therefore, the difficulty to borrow Chapter 11 stocks and high arbitrageur risks explain why it is hard for arbitrageurs to profit from the negative abnormal returns.
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More precisely, this is true only when the equity is worthless, which accounts for most of sample cases. In other cases, the value of old equity is specified as a conversion ratio to new stocks or warrants. Although the exact value of new stocks and warrants is not known at the resolution time, it provides significantly more guidance to value the old equity, compared to before the confirmation of a reorganization or liquidation plan. 37 bankruptcy filings between 1979 and 1986 . Eberhart, Moore, and Roenfeldt (1990 examine the amount paid to shareholders in excess of the amount they would have received under the APR, and find that it represents an average of 7.6% of the total amount awarded to all claimants from a sample of 30 filings from 1979 to 1986. They further show that common share values reflect the value received in violation of APR, suggesting that deviations from the rule are expected by the equity market. Betker (1995a) examines the cross-sectional determinants of APR violations in 75 Chapter 11 bankruptcies during [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] , and finds evidence that APR violations are larger when the firm is closer to solvency, banks hold fewer claims, the CEO holds more shares, CEO pay and shareholder wealth are positively related, and the firm retains the exclusive right to propose a bankruptcy plan. Bharath, Werner, and Panchapegesan (2010) find that the APR violations have become less common in recent periods, and they attribute it to the development of debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing and key employee retention plans.
Several papers on bankruptcy also evaluate claims on bankrupt firms in an option framework. Bebchuk (1988 Bebchuk ( , 2000 proposes a new method of dividing the reorganization pie among claim-holders in the Chapter 11 reorganization process by issuing tradable options, replacing the current bargaining process. Bebchuk argues that when the true firm value is unknown, bargaining is inefficient. However, the value of all claims on the bankrupt firm can be synthesized using options with different strike prices, regardless of the true value of the firm. Bebchuk and Chang (1992) develop a sequential bargaining model of the negotiations between shareholders and creditors within Chapter 11. Shareholders have incentives to delay the reorganization process to prolong the option maturity they have on firm assets, while delayed reorganization can hurt overall firm value due to additional financial distress costs. In the equilibrium, creditors are willing to sacrifice some of their claims for shareholders to achieve faster reorganization resolution. The argument is empirically supported by Franks and Torous (1994) , who find that Chapter 11 reorganizations have lower equity deviations from absolute priority and lower creditor recovery rates, compared to out-of-court exchange offers. Building on the prior literature, our paper conducts a comprehensive analysis with the newly available inbankruptcy data in the option framework.
There are a few papers studying stock performance before bankruptcy filing. For example, Clark and Weinstein (1983) examine filing cases before the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act and find evidence of large equity losses over long periods of time prior to filing. Aharony, Jones, and Swary (1980) compare risk and return characteristics of bankrupt stocks with matched non-bankrupt firms using pre-filing capital market data. They find that the bankrupt sample displays significant negative cumulative returns starting from four years before filing. Several studies have focused on the performance of bankrupt firms and their securities after the bankruptcy resolutions. Hotchkiss (1995) studies the accounting performance of bankrupt firms after they emerge from Chapter 11 and shows that more than 40% of them continue to experience operating losses in the three years following emergence. Eberhart, Altman, and Aggarwal (1999) evaluate postbankruptcy performance of ''orphan stocks''-new issuance of equity for firms emerging from bankruptcy. They report evidence of large positive excess returns in the 200 days following emergence. Very few papers have examined the stock performance during the Chapter 11 process. A few exceptions are Dawkins, Bhattacharya, and Bamber (2007) , who study the price patterns in the short period (one to two weeks) after Chapter 11 filings and find a return reversal from the negative filing price reaction during bull markets, and Morse and Shaw (1988) , who examine a sample of 56 stocks traded after filing in the 1978-1982 period and find no abnormal returns within three years. Our finding of substantial negative returns for a large cross-section of firms during the Chapter 11 process contrasts sharply with the findings in the prior literature.
Our paper is also related to the literature on heterogeneous beliefs and limits to arbitrage. There have been both theoretical and empirical developments following the seminal paper by Miller (1977) . See, for example, Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) , Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002) , and Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) , among others, for new theoretical models, and see Figlewski (1981) , Figlewski and Webb (1993) , Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) , and Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006) , among others, for empirical studies. Most previous empirical studies focus on one of the following two conditions: the degree of disagreement and the short-sale constraints. Theoretically, the overvaluation can last forever if the bubble persists over time. By studying the performance of bankrupt stocks from the bankruptcy filing date to the final resolution date (when the bubble ''bursts''), our paper provides a test that meets three conditions: the existence of disagreement, short-sale constraints, and the eventual return of prices to their fundamental values.
Data description
We first compile a sample of Chapter 11 filings between 1998 and early 2006 from an online data vendor, http://www.bankruptcydata.com. The sample starts from 1998 since it is when the daily trading information became available from Pink Sheets. On any given day before or after Chapter 11 filings, if the stock is already delisted from major exchanges, we collect the trading data from Pink Sheets, which provides the daily highest, lowest, and closing prices, as well as bid-ask quotes and trading volume. If the stock is not delisted, we collect the same data from CRSP. The final bankruptcy resolution dates and outcomes are mainly provided by Edward Altman. We supplement the missing values with Bankruptcydata.com and Lynn Lopucki's Bankruptcy Research Database. If the firm is successfully reorganized, the resolution date is the confirmation date of the reorganization plan. If the firm is liquidated or converted to Chapter 7, the resolution date is the confirmation date of the liquidation plan or the conversion date. In addition, whether a firm negotiates its reorganization plan with creditors before filing (a ''prepackaged'' filing), whether it receives additional financing after filing (DIP financing), and whether an equity committee is formed are the important aspects of Chapter 11 filings as documented in the bankruptcy literature (e.g., Betker, 1995b; Tashjian, Lease, and McConnell, 1996; Dahiya, John, Puri, and Ramirez, 2003; Bharath, Werner, and Panchapegesan, 2010; among others) . Thus, we collect this information for all cases from three sources: http://www. bankruptcydata.comLynn Lopucki's Bankruptcy Research Database, and through news search. 10 We also gather the accounting information of these firms from the last quarterly filings with the SEC before Chapter 11 filings. To guarantee that the accounting information accurately describes sample firms' conditions at the time of Chapter 11 filings, we require all quarterly filings to be within 12 months of bankruptcy filing. Around 90% of the sample firms have the last quarterly filing within six months before Chapter 11 filing.
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In our sample, about 22% of cases are prepackaged filings, 41% of cases have DIP financing, and 27% of cases have equity committees.
We also exclude cases from our study that do not have the same economic meaning as a standard Chapter 11 filing, and the ones that are insignificant in terms of size. Specifically, we drop firms in any of the following cases: (1) firms filing for Chapter 11 for non-distress reasons such as litigations; 11 (2) firms filing for Chapter 11 for the second time; (3) firms with a pre-filing asset size of less than $1 million; and (4) firms with the first post-filing trading price of less than $0.01. Our final sample consists of 602 Chapter 11 filing cases. Table 1 shows the distribution of final resolution outcomes of Chapter 11 filings and their durations. We classify the final outcomes into five categories: (1) Emerged or Reorganized; (2) Liquidated or Converted to Chapter 7; (3) Acquired, Merged, or Sold; (4) Case Dismissed by the court; and (5) Unknown. Note that even for the ''Unknown'' cases, there is a confirmation date available in the data; only the outcome cannot be determined. So these cases are by no means abandoned by the court or claim-holders. Among the 584 firms with known outcomes, successful reorganization cases account for slightly less than half of the sample, while liquidation and acquisition cases account for the other half. We also calculate the length of time (in terms of calendar days) from the bankruptcy filing date to the final resolution date (reorganization confirmation date, liquidation date, or the date of conversion to Chapter 7). The median duration of all bankruptcies is 350 days. Interestingly, we find that firms that are reorganized successfully spend less time in bankruptcy than the ones that are liquidated, with median durations of 266 days and 401 days, respectively. One reason is that the reorganized group includes more prepackaged filings, which spend less time in bankruptcy. Our sample distribution of the resolution outcome and duration is comparable to Bharath, Werner, and Panchapegesan (2010) . Their sample of Chapter 11 filings from 1979 to 2005 contains 626 filing cases, around 60% of which are successfully reorganized, and the median duration is 14 months. The fact that their sample firms are more likely to be reorganized successfully and tend to stay in Chapter 11 longer is due to the larger asset size of their firms. The majority of their sample firms are collected from Lynn Lopucki's Bankruptcy Research Database, which only covers filings by firms with asset size above $100 million. Table 2 gives the descriptive statistics of variables reported or constructed with information in the last quarterly filings with the SEC before Chapter 11 filings. We are able to find or compute total assets, book equity, and leverage ratio for all sample firms. Only a small number of firms have missing data for net income, tangible ratio, or return on assets (ROA). Panel A provides the distribution summary statistics of these variables. Since we require our sample firms to have a pre-filing asset size of more than $1 million, the minimum total asset value is $1 million. The mean asset value of the sample is $857 million with a standard deviation of $3,209 million, which means that the sample is not concentrated on small or large firms. The averages of net income, book equity, and ROA are negative. However, not all firms have negative net income, book equity, or ROA before bankruptcy filings. The maximum net income is $48.21 million, the maximum book equity is $6,584 million, and the maximum ROA is 10%. We hand-checked firms with positive net income, book equity, or ROA to make sure that these firms indeed file for Chapter 11 due Table 2 Firm characteristics.
Characteristics of firms that filed for Chapter 11 between 1998 and 2006. Panel A reports the summary statistics. Panel B reports the correlation matrix (Pearson below the diagonal and Spearman above the diagonal). Accounting information is from the last quarterly filing before Chapter 11 filings. Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities over total assets; Tangible Ratio is the ratio of tangible assets over total assets; ROA is the ratio of EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) over total assets. 
to distress. 12 Leverage is calculated as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, with a median value of 0.96. 13 The tangible ratio ranges from 0% to 94%. The financial variables indicate that sample firms are, on average, in bad operating condition and highly leveraged at the time of their Chapter 11 filings. Panel B is the correlation matrix of firm characteristics. It suggests that in our sample, there is no significant correlation between size and leverage ratio. Larger firms tend to be more profitable and have higher tangible asset ratios.
Trading of Chapter 11 stocks
In the bankruptcy literature, trading of distressed stocks after Chapter 11 filings is not well studied. The common perception is that equity is wiped out upon Chapter 11 filings, and thus trading must be scarce. The fact that traditional databases, such as CRSP, do not cover delisted stocks also creates the problem of data availability. Using the daily trading data provided by Pink OTC Markets Inc., our intent is to shed some light on this topic. For each sample firm, we also collect the institutional ownership data before and after the Chapter 11 filing from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings Database. This dataset is based on Form 13F filed quarterly with the SEC by institutional managers with $100 million or more in assets under management. With the available data, we mainly investigate the following questions: (1) On any given day after filing until the final bankruptcy resolution date, what is the percentage of Chapter 11 stocks that are traded? (2) Who trades Chapter 11 stocks: institutional investors or individual investors?
To investigate the percentage of stocks traded in Chapter 11 on each trading day after filing, we first calculate the total number of firms remaining in the Chapter 11 process after filing. After 252 trading days (one calendar year), approximately 300 firms (around half of the sample) have exited Chapter 11. This result is consistent with the overall duration distribution in Table 1 , which shows that the sample median duration is around 350 calendar days. We then use the number of firms remaining in the Chapter 11 process as the denominator and the number of firms with available daily closing prices and trading volume as the numerator to calculate the percentage of firms traded on each trading day. Fig. 1 shows the percentage of traded Chapter 11 stocks on each trading day through the three years following the Chapter 11 filing. Panel A suggests that, after a brief reduction of trading in the few days immediately following Chapter 11 filing, trading picks up steadily 12 For example, the firm with the highest net income of $48.21 million is Waxman USA Inc., which filed for Chapter 11 on October 2, 2000. Checking all 10-Q filings of the company before its Chapter 11 filing, we discovered that the reported net incomes were negative except the last pre-Chapter 11 10-Q on September 30, 2000, which was because of the sale of a subsidiary. ''The company completed the sale of all of the remaining common stock of Barnett Inc. owned by Waxman USA Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of the Company, and applied the proceeds to repay Waxman USA's 11 1/8% Senior Notes due 2001, reduce working capital borrowings from Congress and to pay taxes and other expenses associated with the transaction,'' as quoted from its last 10-Q report. The firm with the highest ROA of 10% is Metrocall Inc., which filed for Chapter 11 on June 3, 2002. This is because we compute ROA using EBITDA, which is before depreciation. The company has a large amount of depreciation of $18 million, which accounts for 10% of total assets. Thus, its net income is À$29 million. 13 Marchfirst Inc. has the minimum leverage ratio of 6%. It filed for Chapter 11 on April 12, 2001. It is a shortlived international systems integrator and Internet consulting company at the tail end of the dot-com boom. It was a NASDAQ-traded public company whose peak stock price reached $52. By the time the company filed for bankruptcy, it traded for pennies ($0.16 on March 28, 2001). within a month. Overall, as shown in Panel B, trading of Chapter 11 stocks happens far more than what is generally perceived: the percentage is well above 50% on most trading days, even after three years post-filing.
Given the frequent trading of Chapter 11 stocks, we turn to the question of who is trading these stocks: Are they institutional investors or individual investors? We collect the institutional ownership data in each quarter around the Chapter 11 filing time from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings Database. Out of 602 sample firms, we are able to find 592 firms covered at some point by this database. One relevant caveat of the database is that it is only mandatory to report positions in exchange-traded securities.
14 Thus, a firm can be missing from the dataset in any quarter for either of the two following reasons: (1) the stock is exchange-traded, but the total institutional holding for the stock is zero; or (2) the stock is delisted, thus institutional investors are not required by the SEC to 14 According to the SEC, ''Section 13(f) securities generally include equity securities that trade on an exchange or are quoted on the NASDAQ National Markety.'' Official lists of Section 13(f) securities each quarter can be found at: http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13flists.htm. report their holdings of the stock, which can be zero or positive. Since many of the sample firms are delisted at some point around Chapter 11 filing, not all firms are covered in every event quarter. To resolve this issue, we analyze the data in two ways.
As the first step of the analysis, we look at the number of firms found in the database and the percentage of institutional ownership in each quarter around their Chapter 11 filings (see Panel A of Fig. 2) . The x-axis is the event quarter relative to the Chapter 11 filing date, the left y-axis is the number of sample firms reported in Form 13F filings, and the right y-axis is the percentage of institutional ownership. The number of sample firms held and reported by institutional investors decreases sharply from well above 500 to around 200 through one year before to one year after filing. Without making any assumptions about the actual holdings for firms not found by the Form 13F Database, we compute the sample median of percentage institutional ownership across reported firms in each event quarter. Chapter 11 filings apparently have a significant negative effect on institutional ownership. There is a persistent trend that institutional investors are unloading the stocks as a firm approaches Chapter 11 filing. The median percentage decreases from around 20% one year before filing to below 5% at the time of filing, and close to 1% one year after filing. In the second step, as shown in Panel B of Fig. 2 , we conduct a more robust analysis by studying only the subsample of 48 firms that remain exchange traded until the second quarter after their Chapter 11 filings. Since it is mandatory to report positions in these stocks on Form 13F through the period of quarter (À4, 1) around filing time, the institutional ownership data are robust in regards to the above-mentioned no-coverage issue due to delisting. The median institutional ownership for these firms also decreases monotonically from around 30% one year before filing to below 10% one-quarter after filing. Considering that when institutional investors choose to hold Chapter 11 stocks, they should prefer exchange-traded ones due to better liquidity, a conservative upper-bound for average institutional ownership after Chapter 11 filing is 10%. Both panels in Fig. 2 thus suggest that institutional investors start to unload bankrupt stocks before and around Chapter 11 filings. This finding contrasts sharply with our earlier results on active trading of Chapter 11 stocks, as shown in Fig. 1 . Combining these results, we conclude that most active trading of Chapter 11 stocks is by individual investors. It is worth mentioning that our result is not inconsistent with the notion that institutional investors often engage in ''vulture investing'' by taking control of distressed firms. The latter is mostly done by buying distressed debt rather than distressed equity (Gilson, 1990; Jiang, Li, and Wang, 2012) .
We summarize our main findings on the trading of Chapter 11 stocks as follows: (1) Active trading exists for Chapter 11 stocks on Pink Sheets. The percentage of stocks traded is above 50%, even after the firms stay in Chapter 11 for three years. (2) Institutional investors sell stocks upon the Chapter 11 filing news. Institutional ownership of Chapter 11 stocks post-filing is less than 10%, suggesting that the active trading of bankrupt stocks is mainly generated by individual investors.
The valuation of Chapter 11 stocks
As shown in the previous section, Chapter 11 filings have a significant negative effect on stock prices. However, stock prices do not drop to zero after filing. Rather, they are mostly traded well above zero, and trading remains active long after the filings. So what is the fundamental value of these stocks? We argue that the value of Chapter 11 stocks comes from the call option value on firm assets. Shareholders could end up getting no payoff in the final reorganization plans or liquidation plans, but ex ante the option value should be positive unless the chance of getting anything is zero. Chapter 11 allows the firm to continue its business operations. It is possible that business might improve by the time the firm is evaluated to determine payoffs to claim-holders. Meanwhile, as documented in the APR violation literature, shareholders can negotiate with creditors in the bankruptcy court to lower the amount of debt paid back, which essentially lowers the strike price of the call option and causes the option to be in-the-money.
In the following sections, we use two different but related methods to test our option pricing explanation of the valuation of Chapter 11 stocks. First, we use the Black-Scholes pricing model to explain the initial value of Chapter 11 stock at the time of filing. Second, we examine whether the payoff structure of buying the Chapter 11 stocks is related to the firm's fundamental value as predicted by the option theory. To obtain a useful sample for the analysis in this section, we restrict the stocks to satisfy the following conditions: (1) the first trading day after Chapter 11 filing is within 30 days after the filing date; (2) there is trading on the bankruptcy resolution date, or within 30 days after the resolution date; and (3) the time between the first trading day after Chapter 11 filing to the first trading day on or after the bankruptcy resolution date is no less than 30 days.
5.1. The Black-Scholes call option value and market value of Chapter 11 stocks Merton (1974) shows that when a firm's debt is a zero-coupon bond, the equity value as a contingent claim on firm value, V, can be solved using the Black-Scholes option formula, where the underlying value process is the firm value process and the strike price is the face value of the debt. When a firm needs to make interest payments before the debt maturity date, or not all of its debts mature on the same date, this method is not very accurate. However, there are no interest payments during the Chapter 11 process, and all debts need to be paid off at the same time on the Chapter 11 resolution date. Thus, it is reasonable to use the Black-Scholes formula to calculate the equity value after Chapter 11 filing as follows:
where V is the current firm value, X is the strike price of the call option, s is the underlying asset volatility, r is the risk-free rate, and T is the maturity of the option, i.e., the length of time that the firm expects to stay in Chapter 11. Measuring V, X, and r is relatively straightforward. Both V and X can be found in the last pre-bankruptcy quarterly filing. We use total assets as firm value V.
15 X is measured by the face value of the sum of short-term debt and long-term debt. Risk-free rate r is the annualized one-month T-bill rate in the month of Chapter 11 filing.
16
The asset volatility s needs to capture the underlying business risk of the firm. We compute it using a ''matching firms'' approach. We do not use any volatility measure of the bankrupt firms themselves since the volatility of these firms can capture more of the ''filing uncertainty'' rather than the underlying business risk. Thus, we use the average asset volatility of matching firms for each bankrupt firm. The matching firms are constructed by industry and size: for each bankrupt firm, at the time of Chapter 11 filing, we select all the firms that are in the same Fama-French 48-industry group and in the same decile sorted by book asset value. We calculate an annualized asset volatility for each firm in the matching group of each bankrupt firm at the time of its Chapter 11 filing. The asset volatility is constructed using the KMV-Merton model as in Bharath and Shumway (2008) . 17 Then, the average of all matching firms' asset volatilities is used as the proxy for the bankrupt firm's asset volatility s.
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We also use an alternative measure defined as Firm Value ¼EVþShort Term Debtþ0.5nLong Term Debt, where EV is the market value of equity one day after the Chapter 11 filing date. The results remain similar. 16 We get similar results using longer term Treasury rates.
17
Using daily data from the past one year, an initial annualized asset volatility is estimated as a standard deviation of daily percentage change of firm asset value, which is assumed to be equal to daily equity market value plus the book value of debt. Then the Black-Scholes formula is used to calculate the model implied daily firm asset value given that the equity market value, which is the call option value, is observed each day. After that, a second asset volatility is calculated with the model-implied daily firm asset value. The iteration continues until the two asset volatility numbers converge (i.e., difference is smaller than 0.001).
The maturity of the call option T should be the expected Chapter 11 duration at the time of the filing. Although we do observe realized durations of sample firms, they are not the same as expected durations. Therefore, we approximate investors' expectation with a simple linear regression model to get the conditional mean. Denis and Rodgers (2007) find that Chapter 11 duration is related to firm size, leverage, profitability, and industry. We regress realized durations on these variables and use the fitted value as the expected durations. The regression equation is:
The accounting variables are measured in the last quarterly filing before bankruptcy.
As a first-step analysis, we plot the observed market value of equity one day after Chapter 11 filing against the Black-Scholes option value, as shown in Fig. 3 . To accommodate the heterogeneity of size among sample firms, we take the logarithm of the variables. The scatter plot shows a significant relation between the observed market value of Chapter 11 stocks and the theoretical Black-Scholes option value.
To further test the hypothesis that the market value of Chapter 11 stocks depends on the intrinsic option value, we run a regression analyzing the relation of the two:
where EV is the logarithm of the market value of Chapter 11 stocks on the first trading day after bankruptcy filing, and C is the logarithm of the Black-Scholes option value. In addition, 
Market Equity Value
Black-Scholes Option Value Fig. 3 . Log market equity value against log Black-Scholes option value. The market equity value is observed one day after Chapter 11 filings. The Black-Scholes option value is calculated using the call option formula:
CðV ,X ,r,T,s 2 Þ ¼ VNðd 1 ÞÀXe ÀrT Nðd 2 Þ,
where V is the value of total assets in the last pre-bankruptcy quarterly filing, X is the sum of short-term debt and long-term debt in the last pre-bankruptcy quarterly filing, r is the risk-free rate at filing, s is the underlying asset volatility constructed as the average of matching firms' asset volatilities, and T is the predicted duration of the Chapter 11 process.
we also expand the explanatory variables to the inputs of the Black-Scholes formula:
where EV is the logarithm of the market value of Chapter 11 stocks on the first trading day after bankruptcy filing, Assets is the logarithm of total assets, Volatility is the average annual asset volatility of matching firms, Short-Term Debt is the logarithm of short-term debt, LongTerm Debt is the logarithm of long-term debt, Risk-Free is the risk-free rate, and Duration is the predicted duration. The Black-Scholes formula predicts that b 1 40, b 2 40, b 3 o0, b 4 o0, b 5 40, and b 6 40.
It is worth noting that Franks and Torous (1994) consider the ''option-to-delay,'' which is a form of threatening to enter Chapter 11 or once in Chapter 11, delaying the firm's emergence from reorganization. The main variable of interest in Franks and Torous is the ratio of debt to value: options that are closer to being at-the-money, according to Franks and Torous, increases shareholder bargaining power and causes more APR violations. In contrast, our predictions of the option theory rely on the idea that the stock value upon filing also consists of an embedded call option on firm assets. In other words, our predictions are based on a collection of variables including total assets, debts, volatility, risk-free rate, and duration. Therefore, the main difference distinguishing the option valuation we discuss here and the APR violations related to option-to-delay discussed by Franks and Torous lies in the predictions regarding the coefficients of volatility, risk-free rate, and duration.
To further control for the effect of APR violations on equity value, we use three dummy variables: Prepack¼ 1 if the filing is pre-negotiated with creditors and 0 otherwise; DIP¼ 1 if the firm receives DIP financing during bankruptcy and 0 otherwise; and Equity Committee¼ 1 if an equity committee is formed and 0 otherwise. Tashjian, Lease, and McConnell (1996) document that the frequency of APR violations is higher for secured creditors in prepackaged filings than in traditional Chapter 11 filings. Bharath, Werner, and Panchapegesan (2010) find that the likelihood of an APR violation increases in prepackaged filings. They also suggest that DIP financing could act as an effective deterrent to APR violations through stringent restrictions for financing, and that the existence of an equity committee increases the probability of an APR violation. If the expectation of an APR violation is a significant determinant of stock value after bankruptcy filing, we expect the coefficient of Prepack to be positive, the coefficient of DIP to be negative, and the coefficient of Equity Committee to be positive.
The estimation results are shown in Table 3 . In model 1, the call option value C is significantly related to the equity value EV and can explain 27.5% of the cross-sectional variation of the latter. In model 2, all inputs in the Black-Scholes formula show the expected signs as predicted by the option theory, and all of them are statistically significant except for Short-Term Debt.
18 The adjusted R-square further increases to 36.8%. It is worth noting that, in any option pricing model, one of the most important determinants of option price is volatility. Therefore, the success of our option-based explanation hinges on the coefficient for Volatility, which turns out to be positive and significant in all specifications.
19 Moreover, the coefficients of Risk-Free and Duration also support the hypothesis that Chapter 11 stocks have 18 One possible explanation is that we use the last quarterly financial statement before the bankruptcy filing to measure the liabilities at filing. Thus, long-term debt is a more reliable measure than short-term debt.
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The fact that we have to use the volatility measure of matching firms as a proxy suggests that the results should be even stronger if the asset volatility of the Chapter 11 firm is available. intrinsic option value. In model 3, we add the variables for APR violations to the regression model. The coefficients of Prepack and DIP have the signs predicted by the APR literature, but they are not significant. The coefficient of Equity Committee is positive and significant, suggesting that APR violation expectations explain part of the equity value. More importantly, after controlling for APR violation, the inputs of the option model remain Table 3 Explaining market value of Chapter 11 stocks with the Black-Scholes option value.
Coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) of the following regression equations:
where EV is the logarithm of the market value of Chapter 11 stocks on the first trading day after Chapter 11 filing, and C is the logarithm of the Black-Scholes option value. The construction of C is described in Section 5.1.
where Assets is the logarithm of total assets; Volatility is the average annual asset volatility of matching firms; Short-Term Debt is the logarithm of short-term debt; Long-Term Debt is the logarithm of long-term debt; RiskFree is the risk-free rate; Duration (in calendar days) is the predicted duration with explanatory variables of total assets, leverage ratio, ROA, tangible ratio, and the Fama-French 10 industry dummy variables; Prepack is a dummy variable of whether the filing is pre-negotiated; DIP is a dummy variable of whether the firm receives debtor-in-possession financing; and Equity Committee is a dummy variable of whether an equity committee is formed. significant, suggesting that the option theory explains the valuation of bankrupt equity beyond the expected APR violation.
Model
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To address the concern that predicted duration as an explanatory variable could be correlated with the other variables (debt and asset), we run robustness checks excluding the predicted duration variable from the explanatory variables. The results, as shown in models 4 and 5 of Table 3 , remain similar to those in models 2 and 3. The indicator of the success of the option theory: the coefficient on the asset volatility variable is still significantly positive. The coefficients of all other option variables also have the same signs as predicted.
The payoff structure of Chapter 11 stocks
If Chapter 11 stocks are indeed out-of-money call options on firm assets, the holding period return of these stocks should depend on the underlying firm performance in a non-linear way: the correlation of the two should be high when firm performance is high and zero otherwise. Since the underlying firm performance is not directly observable, we construct a proxy for it using the performance of an equal-weighted portfolio of industry-and size-matching firms over the Chapter 11 duration of the bankrupt firm. The matching firms are constructed the same way as in the asset volatility calculation described in Section 5.1. Since all matching firms are in the same decile, the equal-weighted and value-weighted results are similar. Furthermore, we calculate the buy-and-hold return of each matching firm before we take the average to avoid rebalancing bias. When calculating the buy-and-hold return for each matching firm, we take into account the delisting return following the method used in the prior literature.
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The holding period return of Chapter 11 stocks is defined as the return from the first trading day after Chapter 11 filing to the bankruptcy resolution date. If there is no trading on the bankruptcy resolution date, we use the price on the first trading day after the resolution date. We consider this period to be the holding period. Denote holding period returns (HPR) by
where P last is the price on the last trading day of the holding period, and P first is the price on the first trading day of the holding period. Fig. 4 shows the scatter plot of the HPR of Chapter 11 stocks against the buy-and-hold return of an equal-weighted portfolio of matching firms over the same period. 23 There are quite a few stocks with very large positive HPR on the right-hand side of the graph (where the performance of matching firms is relatively good), while most stocks have returns close to À100% on the left-hand side. To systematically test the relation between the performance of Chapter 11 stocks and the matching firms, we estimate a piecewise linear regression:
Our results remain the same if we use moneyness (the ratio of debt over total assets) to replace the level of debts in the analysis.
When a stock is delisted, we include its delisting return in CRSP if it is available. If the delisting return is missing in CRSP and the delisting code is either 500 or falls between 505 and 588, we assume the stock is delisted for negative reasons. For these stocks, we replace the missing delisting return with À30% for NYSE/AMEX stocks and À55% for NASDAQ stocks.
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Since there is no dividend for Chapter 11 stocks, the only gain/loss is the price appreciation or depreciation. where HPR i is the holding period return for the bankrupt stock i; HPR match,i is the buy-andhold return of an equal-weighted portfolio of matching firms for bankrupt stock i over the same holding period; and y i is a dummy variable (1 if HPR match,i is above a certain threshold, and 0 otherwise).
To ensure continuity, we impose the following restriction on g low , b low , g high and b high :
We set Threshold ¼ 0 exogenously to estimate the parameters. The regression results show that b low ¼ 0:10 with t-statistic ¼ 0.36, and b high ¼ 2:40 with t-statistic¼ 2.46. Panel A of Fig. 5 plots the fitted lines of the piece-wise regression for the entire sample. The return correlation between a bankrupt stock and its matching firms exhibits strong non-linearity: the correlation is significantly positive when the return of matching firms is positive and is zero otherwise. This finding suggests that the returns to Chapter 11 stocks are similar to those obtained from buying out-of-money call options on equal-weighted portfolios of matching firms. We further conjecture that the option payoff structure could be more pronounced for some Chapter 11 stocks than others, depending on whether a firm is expected to be reorganized. The option value should only be viable if the firm is expected to continue its business, and there is a time value regarding its future business success. If a firm is expected to be liquidated, then there is hardly any option value embedded in equity. In this case, the return correlation of the stock and matching firms should be close to zero regardless of the performance of the latter. Panels B and C in Fig. 5 show the fitted lines of piece-wise regressions for two subsamples: the ones successfully reorganized and the ones liquidated or converted to Chapter 7. For the subsample that is reorganized, the resemblance to option payoffs is more dramatic: b low ¼ 0:34 with t-statistic ¼ 0.99, and b high ¼ 2:23 with t-statistic ¼ 3.22. For the subsample that is eventually liquidated or converted to Chapter 7, it is almost one flat line: b low ¼ À0:11 with t-statistic ¼À0.18, and b high ¼ À0:04 with t-statistic ¼À0.26. Matching Sample Return Fig. 4 . Holding period return of Chapter 11 stocks against matching sample returns. The holding period return of Chapter 11 stocks is defined as: HPR ¼ ðP last ÀP first Þ=P first , where P last is the price on the last trading day of the holding period, and P first is the price on the first trading day of the holding period. The holding period is from the first trading day after filing to the resolution date, or the first trading day after the resolution date if there is no trading on the resolution date. The matching sample return is the buy-and-hold return of an equal-weighted portfolio matched by industry and size over the same holding period.
In summary, the analysis on the value of Chapter 11 stocks and their return correlation with underlying firm performance supports the hypothesis that Chapter 11 stocks are traded well above zero because they have a fundamental option value on firm assets.
The performance of Chapter 11 stocks
We investigate the performance of Chapter 11 stocks in the holding period as defined in Section 5.2. Since some Chapter 11 cases get resolved earlier than others, HPR of different stocks represents performances over different time horizons. Thus, we calculate a standardized 
with the restriction of g low þ b low nThreshold ¼ g high þ b high nThreshold, where HPR i is the holding period return for the bankrupt stock i; HPR match,i is the buy-and-hold return of an equal-weighted portfolio of matching firms for bankrupt stock i over the same holding period; and y i is a dummy variable (1 if HPR match,i is above a threshold, and 0 otherwise). We set Threshold¼ 0. Panel A: Full sample. Panel B: Emerged or reorganized. Panel C: Liquidated or converted to Chapter 7. monthly holding period return, MHPR ¼ ð1 þ HPRÞ 21=t , where t is the number of trading days in the holding period. We then calculate the risk-adjusted returns in two ways: using the buy-and-hold return of the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ market index, and using the buy-and-hold return of an equal-weighted portfolio matched by industry and size over the holding period as described in the previous section. 24 They are defined as follows: Table 4 gives distribution statistics of HPR, MHPR, MHPR MarketAdj , and MHPR MatchAdj for sample stocks. The mean and median for all return measures are negative. Specifically, the median market-adjusted monthly return is À14% and the industry-and size-adjusted monthly return is À15%. Because HPR is heavily left-skewed, we conduct the Wilcoxon rank tests for all return measures to examine whether they are different from zero. The p-values are all close to zero, suggesting that the performance of Chapter 11 stocks is significantly negative both before and after the risk adjustment. Table 5 describes the distribution statistics of HPR and MHPR MatchAdj sorted by the initial price level, final outcome, and delisting time. The initial price level is a proxy for firm size. The final outcome is relevant because successfully reorganized firms are supposedly the ones with Table 4 Performance of Chapter 11 stocks.
Return distributions of Chapter 11 stocks. The holding period is defined as the number of days from the first trading day after filing to the resolution date, or the first trading day after the resolution date if there is no trading on the resolution date. The holding period return (HPR) is defined as: HPR ¼ ðP last ÀP first Þ=P first , where P last is the price on the last trading day of the holding period, and P first is the price on the first trading day of the holding period. The average monthly return (MHPR) is defined as: MHPR ¼ ð1 þ HPRÞ 21=t , where t is the number of trading days during the holding period. The market-adjusted average monthly return (MHPR MarketAdj ) is defined as: Using equal-weighted market index return or value-weighted matching portfolio return does not change the results.
better operating performance during Chapter 11. We expect these stocks to exhibit better returns, as long as the resolution outcome is not 100% predictable at the time of filing. Delisting is generally a result of bad performance, and in return it also affects stock prices adversely, as shown in Harris, Panchapagesan, and Werner (2008) . Results shown in Table 5 confirm that firms eventually reorganized experience less negative returns, while firms delisted within Chapter 11 have more negative returns. However, returns do not seem to depend on the initial price level of the stocks. In addition, untabulated results indicate that the negative returns are persistent over time and do not cluster in a particular year.
Given the observation of large negative abnormal returns of Chapter 11 stocks in the sample, we investigate two related questions. First, why do the negative abnormal returns exist in the first place? Second, given the existence of the negative abnormal returns, why do not arbitrageurs short the stocks and correct the prices? Our answers to these questions are motivated by the information uncertainty surrounding the Chapter 11 stocks at bankruptcy filings and the difficulty of short-selling these stocks. Miller (1977) argues that the very uncertain nature of financial markets implies heterogeneous evaluations of the same financial asset. Therefore, in a market with restricted short selling and when investors have heterogeneous beliefs about the value of a risky asset, prices will reflect a more Table 5 Distribution statistics of HPR and MHPR MatchAdj sorted by price, outcome, and delisting time.
Distribution statistics of HPR and MHPR MatchAdj sorted by the initial price level right before filing, resolution outcome, and delisting time. The holding period return is defined as: HPR ¼ ðP last ÀP first Þ=P first , where P last is the price on the last trading day of the holding period, and P first is the price on the first trading day of the holding period. The industry-and size-adjusted average monthly return is defined as: optimistic valuation. In the next section, we show that this is exactly the case for the valuation of stocks after Chapter 11 filings. Furthermore, we address a unique feature of Chapter 11 stocks: at the final bankruptcy resolution date, the reorganization/liquidation plan states explicitly the true value of the stock. At this point, fundamental value is revealed, and prices are corrected to reflect the true fundamental value. As a result, the buy-and-hold return from filing to resolution becomes negative.
6.1. Information uncertainty, short-sale constraints, and arbitrageur risk of Chapter 11 stocks
When a firm files for Chapter 11, it significantly increases the information uncertainty of its stock. There are several reasons for this effect. First, most stocks are delisted before or around Chapter 11 filings. They can resume trading on Pink Sheets, where listing rules are far less strict than in the major exchanges. SEC filings and disclosures are not mandatory for these stocks. Second, most institutional investors, such as mutual funds and pension funds, cannot hold bankrupt stocks, as stipulated in their investment mandates. Thus, sell-side analysts lack the incentive to research and publish on these stocks. 25 Therefore, the problem of scarce information available for Chapter 11 stocks is further exacerbated. Third, as the stock ownership data shows, more than 90% of the investors are individual investors post-filing. Presumably, individual investors are less efficient in gathering information and less adept at correctly interpreting the available information (Barber and Odean, 2000) . The increased information uncertainty can clearly be seen in the data of average quote spread and intraday volatility around the filing date. Fig. 6 plots the time series of quoted spreads and intraday volatilities from one month (21 trading days) before to one month after the filing date. The large spike for both series centering around the Chapter 11 filing date shows dramatically increased information uncertainty of stocks due to filings.
Short-selling is generally very difficult for Chapter 11 stocks traded on Pink Sheets, and short-sellers face high arbitrageur risks even if they manage to short these stocks in the first place. First, most institutional investors do not hold these stocks. As shown in D' Avolio (2002) , the main suppliers of stock loans are institutional investors. In addition, Nagel (2005) finds that stock loan supply tends to be sparse and short-selling more expensive when institutional ownership is low. Therefore, the substantially increased search and borrowing costs make bankrupt stocks much less attractive to arbitrageurs. Second, Pink Sheets is not as liquid as major exchanges, especially for bankrupt stocks. Quoted spreads for some can be as high as 30%, as shown in Fig. 6 . Therefore, the recalling risk from share lenders is substantially higher for these stocks: If the borrowed shares are called, it may be difficult for the arbitrageur to find a new lender, and it will be expensive to buy the shares in the market. As pointed out by Harris, Panchapagesan, and Werner (2008) , there is limited analyst coverage on stocks trading on Pink Sheets.
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Short-sellers of Chapter 11 stocks are vulnerable to a short squeeze because rumors about bankrupt companies often lead to a rapid increase in the stock price without any justifiable reason. In addition, the high collateral requirement of short-selling relative to the low price level of these stocks imposes another type of arbitrageur risk for bankrupt stocks. information uncertainty and more severe short-sale constraints should experience more negative returns after filing. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) show that dealer bid-ask spreads are related to heterogeneous information among traders. Volatility is used as a standard measure of information uncertainty in the literature (see Zhang, 2006 , among others). Scheinkman and Xiong (2004) provide a detailed survey of literature analyzing how heterogeneous beliefs among investors generate speculation and trading volume. Following the previous literature, we measure the level of information uncertainty with the following variables: the average daily bid-ask spread, the average intraday volatility, and the average trading turnover over the Chapter 11 duration. To measure the short sale constraint, we use the proportion of shares held by institutional investors. Following Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) , we also use the breadth of institutional ownership as another measure of short sale constraint, which is the number of institutional investors holding the stocks. We estimate the following regression: where MHPR MatchAdj is the industry-and size-adjusted monthly return; Quoted Spread is the average daily quoted spread (bid-ask spread divided by the bid-ask midpoint) over the holding period for each firm; Intraday Volatility is the average intraday volatility (difference between the daily highest price and lowest price divided by the closing price) over the holding period for each firm; Turnover is the average trading volume over shares outstanding over the holding period; and Institutional Ownership is measured by either the proportion of shares held by institutional investors at the end of the quarter when the firm files for Chapter 11, or the logarithm of one plus the number of institutional investors.
The results, shown in Table 6 , confirm our hypothesis that stocks with higher quoted spreads, higher intraday volatilities, and higher turnover have significantly lower returns, and that stocks with lower institutional ownership (more severe short-sale constraints) have lower subsequent returns in Chapter 11. 27 Our proxies for information uncertainty and short-sale constraints alone can explain a substantial amount of the cross-sectional variation in stock returns, with adjusted R-squared equal to about 17%. Moreover, all of our proxies for information uncertainty and the percentage of institutional ownership remain highly significant after controlling for firm characteristics and industry-year fixed effects. Examining the effects of control variables on post-filing performance, we find that filing cases that are prepackaged have better returns during Chapter 11. While such a finding is consistent with the APR literature prediction, it also may be that these firms have less information uncertainty, and so the optimistic bias of investors is less severe. Consistent with the APR literature prediction, the existence of an equity committee is positively related to return. Finally, other pre-filing firm characteristics, such as size, leverage, and profitability, have little explanatory power after considering the information variables and short-sale constraint proxies. Overall, our findings indicate that the negative returns of Chapter 11 stocks are mainly caused by initial overvaluation by optimistic investors in the context of heterogeneous beliefs with short-sale constraints.
Since average daily bid-ask spreads and average turnover are also liquidity measures, Table 6 can be interpreted as controlling for the liquidity condition of the stock, information uncertainty proxied by the average intraday volatility is negatively related to returns in Chapter 11. Additionally, as a robustness check, we run the same regression as in Table 6 excluding these two variables, and use the average intraday volatility as the sole measure for information uncertainty. The results essentially remain the same, as shown in Table 7 . The magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficient on Intraday Volatility are both larger as compared to in Table 6 , suggesting the other two measures also correlate with the level of information uncertainty.
Our findings that institutional investors are dropping Chapter 11 stocks imply that the individual investors may have beliefs that are different from institutional investors regarding the value of these stocks. There are many well-documented behavioral biases related to individual investors (see a survey by Barberis and Thaler, 2003) . In particular, Barberis and Huang (2008) rely on an idea in the field of psychology that the brain weights probabilities in a nonlinear way. They show that, in a financial market, such psychology bias will cause some investors to overvalue risky assets with lottery-like payoffs. Given our findings that Chapter 11 stocks resemble out-of-money call options, these stocks provide lottery-like payoffs to investors. Therefore, our results are consistent with the idea that individual investors are more likely than institutional investors to suffer from the probability 27 Results using market-adjusted monthly returns are similar and available upon request.
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weighting bias, thus causing the heterogeneous beliefs regarding Chapter 11 stocks. A detailed analysis of the behavioral biases related to individual investors is outside the scope of our paper, and we will leave it for future research. Table 6 Explaining the performance of Chapter 11 stocks.
Coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) of the following regression equation:
Variables þ e, where MHPR MatchAdj is the industry-and size-adjusted monthly return; Quoted Spread is the average daily quoted spread (bid-ask spread divided by the bid-ask midpoint) over the holding period for each firm; Intraday Volatility is the average intraday volatility (difference between the daily highest price and lowest price divided by the closing price) over the holding period; Turnover is the average trading volume over shares outstanding over the holding period; Institutional Ownership is measured by either the proportion of shares held by institutional investors at the end of the quarter when the firm files for Chapter 11, or the logarithm of one plus the number of institutional investors; Delisted is a dummy variable of the delisting time (1 if the stock is delisted within the Chapter 11 process, and 0 otherwise); Prepack is a dummy variable of whether the filing is pre-negotiated; DIP is a dummy variable of whether the firm receives debtor-in-possession financing; and Equity Committee is a dummy variable of whether an equity committee is formed. Other control variables are defined as in Table 2 
Conclusions
Our paper provides a thorough understanding regarding the trading, value, and performance of the stocks in Chapter 11 using a unique dataset from Pink OTC Markets Inc. First, we show that there is far more active trading of these stocks through the Chapter 11 process than is generally perceived. Institutional investors unload the stocks when firms approach bankruptcy filings, and around 90% of the investors are individual investors post-filing. Second, we show Table 7 Explaining the performance of Chapter 11 stocks-robustness checks.
where MHPR MatchAdj is the industry-and size-adjusted monthly return; Intraday Volatility is the average intraday volatility (difference between the daily highest price and lowest price divided by the closing price) over the holding period; Institutional Ownership is measured by either the proportion of shares held by institutional investors at the end of the quarter when the firm files for Chapter 11, or the logarithm of one plus the number of institutional investors; Delisted is a dummy variable of the delisting time (1 if the stock is delisted within the Chapter 11 process, and 0 otherwise); Prepack is a dummy variable of whether the filing is pre-negotiated; DIP is a dummy variable of whether the firm receives debtor-in-possession financing; and Equity Committee is a dummy variable of whether an equity committee is formed. Other control variables are defined as in Table 2 . that Chapter 11 stocks have positive fundamental values because they are call options on firm assets. The option value calculated using the Black-Scholes model can explain a substantial portion of the cross-sectional variation in the observed market equity values right after filing. Even after controlling for the expectation of APR violations, the equity value after filing is positively related to asset value, asset volatility, risk-free rate, and expected duration, and it is negatively related to liabilities. Moreover, the return correlation between Chapter 11 stocks and an industry-and size-matching sample exhibits strong non-linearity as predicted by the option theory. Third, we document large negative returns of Chapter 11 stocks, both before and after risk adjustments. Recognizing the increased information uncertainty and tightened short-sale constraints accompanying the bankruptcy filing, as well as the unique feature of Chapter 11 stocks that the true value is revealed upon bankruptcy resolution, we provide an explanation for the negative abnormal returns in the context of heterogeneous beliefs with short-sale constraints. Consistent with our hypothesis, we show that stocks with more information uncertainty and lower institutional ownership, and thus more binding short-sale constraints, tend to have more negative returns over the duration of the Chapter 11 process.
